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Is Scientific Modeling an Indirect 
Methodology?
This  article  was inspired  by reading papers  of 
Peter  Godfrey  Smith and  Michael  Weisberg, 
especially, P. Godfrey-Smith (2006: The strategy 
of model-based science, Biology and Philosophy 
21(5):725-740) and M. Weisberg (2007:  Who is 
a  Modeler? The  British  Journal  for  the 
Philosophy of Science 58(2):207-233). 
Both authors promote the idea that modeling is 
an  "indirect  way"  of  theorizing.  Modelers  are 
trying  to  understand  "a  complex  real  world 
system  via understanding  of  a  simpler, 
hypothetical system that resembles it in relevant 
respects"  (Godfrey-Smith,  p.  726).  There  is 
another - "direct way" of theorizing - "seek to 
directly represent the workings of the real-world 
system" (p. 730). Weisberg tries to elaborate on 
specifics  of  the  "direct  way"  calling  it  ADR 
("abstract direct representation", see p. 210).
My  first  point  is  that  this  distinction 
unnecessarily  complicates  the  picture.  In  fact, 
ADR  can  be  better  understood  as  a  form  of 
modeling.
As  an  example  of  "working  directly  with  the 
real-world system",  Weisberg considers the way 
in which Mendeleev produced his Periodic Table 
of  chemical  elements.  "This  scientific  activity 
constitutes  theory  construction,  but  not 
modeling.  Mendeleev  represented  chemical 
phenomena  directly, without the mediation of a 
model.  Although his theoretical  descriptions of 
elemental  properties  and  trends  were  abstract, 
they  were  descriptions  of  properties  of  the 
elements  themselves."  (Weisberg,  p.  215). 
However,  Weisberg is  ready to accept (p.  215) 
that the result of Mendeleev's work (the Table) 
"might be considered as a model". 
I  would  insist  that  not  only  the  result  of 
Mendeleev's  work,  but  also  his  starting  point 
was  not  as  "direct"  as  it  may  seem.  Indeed, 
Mendeleev did not hold in his office the samples 
of all 63 chemical elements known at the time! 
Instead, he used theory and data from books and 
papers, and this theory and data were produced 
during a long highly non-trivial history. Aristotle 
could  not  create  a  periodic  table  of  the  four 
"elements"  of  his  time!  Could  the  non-trivial 
chemical  theory  of  Mendeleev's  time  be 
considered as a "direct representation of reality" 
(i.e., as "finally, true"), and not as an attempt of 
modeling (i.e., in part, as a hypothetical theory)? 
At  least,  the  notion  of  atomic  weight  used  by 
Mendeleev was not  completely "true"  -  it  was 
refined later by the discovery of isotopes.
Mendeleev  may  have  believed  in  the  partly 
hypothetical  chemical  theory  of  his  time  as  a 
"direct representation of reality". Perhaps, he did 
not  try to  guess  in  advance,  which  parts  of  it 
were true, and which were not. This is why he 
did not feel himself as a modeler. But, definitely, 
he was working within a model constructed by 
the  previous  generations  of  chemists!  (By  the 
way,  who  could  be  the  first  person  in  history 
feeling himself  as  a  modeler?  Bolyai,  Gauss, 
Lobachevsky? Or, Plato?)
In a similar way, one can analyze other examples 
of  alleged  "direct  theorizing"  mentioned  by 
Godfrey-Smith  and  Weisberg:  Buss'  work  in 
evolutionary theory and Darwin's theory of atoll 
formation.  And  conclude  that,  in  fact,  "direct 
theorizing"  is  undeliberate  modeling,  believing 
that  the  model  (theory)  one  is  working  in,  is 
"finally, true". 
Perhaps,  some  objections  against  the  above 
argument  will  be  raised  by  referring  to  some 
subtleties discussed in the literature: the model -  
theory relationship,  and  the  model  -  
representation distinction.
In  computer  science,  we  do  not  regard  these 
subtleties as important. We are used to a simpler 
picture: there are models, and there are means of  
building  models (patterns,  templates,  formal 
languages,  meta-models,  ontologies,  theories, 
generic  software  systems,  etc.).  For  example, 
one can build a Newtonian model of the Solar 
system by specifying some initial mass, distance 
and velocity data  of  Sun and planets.  But  one 
can  define  also  a  Newtonian  template for 
building  models  of  arbitrary planet  systems  (a 
model  of  an  "abstract  planet  system").  From 
such  a  template,  by  specifying  parameters 
appropriately, one can obtain a particular model 
of the Solar system. From this point of view, the 
theory of Newtonian mechanics is functioning as 
a set of methods for building models (and model 
templates) of mechanical systems.
The  Newtonian  theory allows  several  different 
formulations  (i.e.  representations)  that  are 
provably  equivalent  (traditional,  Lagrangian, 
Hamiltonian). Does this mean that there is some 
"Newtonian  mechanics"  that  exists 
independently of  these  formulations?  You may 
think so, but why do you need to? How do you 
intend  to  use  such  a  "theory  without 
formulations"?  This  is  why  the  model  -  
representation dictinction might not be taken too 
seriously.  What  really  counts,  are  equivalence 
proofs of different representations.
And  now,  the  main  point.  It  seems,  Godfrey-
Smith and Weisberg consider models as almost 
isolated structures that are invented or picked up 
without  serious  coordination  from one  case  to 
another.  They  do  not  analyze  sequences  of 
models, systems of models, model evolution.  I 
think,  this  is  how  they  could  arrive  at  their 
general  conclusion  about  the  inherent 
indirectness of modeling.
However, let us consider the cognitive opposite 
of  ADR  -  a  situation  when  some  successful 
theoretical construct cannot be observed even in 
principle  -  such  as,  for  example,  quarks.  Do 
quarks  "really  exist",  or  are  they  only  an 
"indirect"  entity  introduced  by  physicists?  For 
the current purposes, this  construct works fine, 
but will this situation continue in the future? If 
not, quarks will be removed from the picture like 
as flogiston and aether were removed. But what 
if  quarks will  be retained as a construct in  all  
future  physical  theories?  Do  physicists  need 
more than this kind of  invariance to claim the 
"real existence" of quarks and believe in having 
a "direct representation" of them?
Thus, if we consider modeling not as a heap of 
contingent  structures,  but  (where  possible)  as 
evolving  coordinated  systems  of  models,  then 
we  can  reasonably  explain  as  "direct 
representations"  even  some  very  complicated 
model-based  cognitive  situations.  Scientific 
modeling  is  not  as  indirect  as  it  may  seem. 
"Direct theorizing" comes later, as the result of a 
successful model evolution.
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